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Abstract
We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger incli-
nation to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the
private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed
rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale sur-
vey were offered a substantial reward and could choose between a
widely redeemable gift certificate, a lottery ticket, or making a dona-
tion to a charity. Our analysis shows that public sector employees are
significantly less likely to choose the risky option (lottery) and, at the
start of their career, significantly more likely to choose the pro-social
option (charity). However, when tenure increases, this difference in
pro-social inclinations disappears and, later on, even reverses. Our
results further suggest that quite a few public sector employees do not
contribute to charity because they feel that they already contribute
enough to society at work for too little pay.
Keywords: public service motivation, risk aversion, revealed pref-
erences data.
JEL codes: H1, J45, M52.
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1 Introduction
It is often argued that preferences and work motivations of public sector
employees differ from those of private sector employees. Some of these dif-
ferences stem from sectoral differences in the nature of jobs. Many jobs in
the public sector involve helping people in need or contributing to society at
large, rendering these jobs attractive to people who have a strong willingness
to serve others or the public interest.1 Another, less honorable motivation
for seeking a job in the public sector is avoidance of risk. In most countries,
employers in the public sector offer higher job security and less volatile wage
compensation than employers in the private sector (Clark and Postel-Vinay
2009, Bonin et al. 2007). As a result, highly risk-averse people may find it
attractive to opt for a job in the public sector (Bellante and Link 1981).
This paper employs a unique dataset to assess whether public sector em-
ployees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse
than people employed in the private sector. In contrast to previous empir-
ical studies, we explore revealed preferences rather than stated preferences.
Our data come from a questionnaire held in 2000 covering more than 3000
employees in The Netherlands. Upon completing the questionnaire, each
participant was offered a reward worth 25 guilders (11,34 euro; about 15%
of daily disposable household income in 2000). Participants could choose
between receiving a widely redeemable gift certificate, receiving a national
lottery ticket, or donating the reward to a charity of their choice. We hypoth-
esize that, as compared to private sector employees, public sector employees
more likely choose to donate to charity (the safe and pro-social choice) and
less likely choose the lottery ticket (the risky choice) rather than choose the
gift certificate (the safe and selfish choice).
Our results lend strong support to the hypothesis that public sector em-
ployees are more risk averse than private sector employees. People holding a
public sector job are much less likely to choose the lottery ticket rather than
the gift certificate. This holds both before and after controlling for income,
gender, age and several other observable characteristics. The difference is
substantial: Our estimation results imply that the odds for a public sector
1See the large literature in public administration on ‘public service motivation’ (e.g.
Perry and Wise 1990, Perry 1996, Rainey and Steinbauer 1999, Wright 2001) and several
recent theoretical studies in economics (e.g. Dixit 2001, Besley and Gathak 2005, Francois
2007, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008). Perry et al. (2009) and Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008)
provide overviews of these literatures.
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worker of choosing the lottery ticket rather than the gift certificate are 0.68
times the odds for a private sector worker.
We find only weak evidence for the hypothesis that public sector employ-
ees more likely choose the pro-social option of donating to charity rather
than choose the selfish option of taking the gift certificate. On the contrary,
our analysis reveals that, after controlling for observable individual char-
acteristics, public sector employees are significantly less likely to donate to
charity. The odds for a public sector worker of donating his reward to charity
rather than taking the gift certificate are 0.74 times the odds for a private
sector worker. Behind this average figure is a remarkable relation between
inclinations to donate to charity and employee’s tenure in a public sector
organization. Employees who have just started a job in the public sector are
significantly more likely than their private sector counterparts to donate to
charity rather than to take the gift certificate. However, within a few years,
this difference disappears and later on even reverses. Importantly, we find
no tenure effects for private sector workers’ inclination to donate to charity,
nor does tenure affect the likelihood of choosing the risky option in either of
the sectors. Moreover, the tenure effect for public sector worker’s inclination
to donate to charity remains intact when we allow for public-sector specific
age effects.
This tenure effect is well in line with the observations made by Blau
(1960: 347, 348) in his study of case workers in a public welfare agency.
He finds that “the attitudes of most new case workers toward clients were
strongly positive, if somewhat sentimental and idealistic (...) the new case
worker was typically full of sympathy for clients’ problems. But as he encoun-
tered clients who blamed him personally for not helping them enough, even
though agency procedure limited him, and clients met his trusting attitude
by cheating and lying, the newcomer tended to experience a ‘reality shock’
(...) This disillusioning experience might make a worker bitter and callous,
or induce him to leave the job, and even those who did not have either of
these extreme reactions tended to change their orientation to clients.” “In
sum, experience increased the case worker’s ability to serve recipients but
decreased his interest in doing so.” (Blau 1960: 359). Likewise, Van Maanen
(1975) reports swift declines in motivation among police recruits during their
first year in a big-city department, which are partly accounted for by more
pessimistic beliefs about the likelihood of receiving favorable responses from
the community to ‘working especially hard.’ Similar findings are reported by
De Cooman et al. (2009) using data from a repeated survey among Flemish
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teachers who just started their professional career. They find that, within
two years time, "work values became somewhat less ideological and more
self-oriented." Further, teachers "attached greater importance to extrinsic
values, including rewards, security, career, and recognition, and less impor-
tance to altruistic values including social service, though these changes were
relatively small." (p. 105-106)2
It is important to note that our analysis gives an indication of people’s
marginal willingness to accept risk and to make charitable contributions;
it does not reveal people’s overall risk aversion or pro-social attitude. The
two need not coincide. For instance, employees in the private sector may
generally be more risk tolerant than public sector employees, but exhibit
more risk averse behavior at the margin because in their professional life
they are already exposed to more risk than public sector employees. Likewise,
public sector employees may be less willing to donate their reward to charity
as they already serve the public interest in their professional life on a day-to-
day basis. Unfortunately, we lack data on how much risk people face and how
much they contribute to the public interest in daily life. However, we do find
some indirect evidence for the idea that public sector employees less likely
donate to charity because they feel they already contribute a lot to society at
work. One of the questions in the survey asked people whether they consider
their salary to be sufficient for the work that they do. People responding
negatively to this question less likely donate their reward to charity rather
than take the gift certificate. Importantly, this effect is significantly stronger
for employees in the public sector, both statistically and economically (the
effect is twice as large). This suggests that public sector employees consider
the contributions they make on the job as a substitute for making charitable
donations. Feeling underpaid explains a large part of the average difference
between pro-social inclinations in the sectors. This is partly due to the
stronger effect of feeling underpaid on public sector employees’ likelihood to
donate. Further, a much larger fraction of employees in the public sector
feel that they are underpaid (56% in the public sector as compared to 42%
in the private sector). Comparing dissatisfied employees in the public and
private sector, we find no significant difference in the early stages of the
career, while later on public sector employees are significantly less likely to
donate. Satisfied public sector employees significantly more often choose to
2Similar patterns have been observed among volunteers, see Tschirhart et al. (2001)
and references therein.
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donate in the early stage of their career, while later on there is no significant
difference with their private sector counterparts.
Although we can only assess people’s risk and pro-social attitude at the
margin, we do think our results are of great relevance for recent debates
about remuneration of employees in the public sector (see, e.g., Burgess and
Ratto 2003, National Commission on the Public Service 2003, OECD 2005
and 2008). First, measuring tolerance for additional risk of public sector em-
ployees gives some indication of the effects of introducing or strengthening
pay-for-performance for workers in the public sector. Making employees’ pay
more dependent of their performance usually increases the risks employees
face, as their performance not only depends on their effort, but also on ran-
dom events. Our results suggest that public sector employees have a stronger
distaste for taking risks than their counterparts in the private sector, imply-
ing that (with the current workforce) pay-for-performance is a more costly
instrument to induce effort in the public sector than in the private sector.
Second, measuring pro-social inclinations at the margin gives an idea about
how much society can rely on public sector employees’ altruistic motivations
when additional helping opportunities arise. Our results give rise to some
pessimism: Many public sector employees feel that they are underpaid rel-
ative to the contributions that they make, which makes them hesitant to
provide further contributions.
We proceed as follows. The next section briefly describes earlier studies on
differences in preferences and motivations between public and private sector
employees. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main results
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
A rich literature in public administration and a growing number of studies
in economics have examined differences in preferences and motivations be-
tween public and private sector employees. Existing empirical studies can
be divided into two groups: those that use stated preferences or motivations
(e.g., by asking respondents how important job security or helping other peo-
ple is to them) and those that infer preferences and motivations from stated
behavior (e.g., self-reported donations to charity, self-reported purchase of in-
surance, stated willingness to pay for a hypothetical lottery, et cetera). Our
study is the first using revealed preferences data rather than stated prefer-
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ences data; that is, we use data on what people actually do, not on what
they say they do or what they claim is important to them. This has some
clear and well-known advantages. In particular, stated preferences data may
be vulnerable to self-stereotyping, self-serving biases, lack of attention by
respondents, and strategic motives (Roszkowski and Grable 2007, Dohmen
et al. 2009). For instance, it has been shown that in experiments with hy-
pothetical payments subjects appear more generous and more risk-preferring
than when real money is at stake (Camerer and Hogarth 1999).
Most studies comparing public and private sector workers have assessed
in how far public sector workers have a particular willingness to serve the
public interest, to help others, and to make personal sacrifices in order to do
so. For instance, Rainey (1982) and Lewis and Frank (2002) find that public
sector workers more often rate work attributes such as ‘Useful to society’ and
‘Help others’ as (very) important (see also Kilpatrick et al. 1964, Buchanan
1975, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000, and Steijn 2008 among others). Houston
(2006) uses data on self-reported pro-social behavior, such as volunteering,
donating blood, and making charitable contributions. He finds that nonprofit
and public sector employees are more likely to report being a volunteer and
blood donor, while no such relation is found for charitable contributions.
Likewise, Brewer (2003) shows that public sector employees report higher
levels of participation in nonpolitical civic affairs. Recently, Gregg et al.
(2009) exploit British panel data and find that individuals who are more
inclined to donate labor (as measured by stated unpaid overtime) select into
the non-profit sector.
Other studies have examined whether public and private sector workers
differ in risk preferences. Studies using stated preferences about job security
find mixed evidence (see e.g. Rainey 1982, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000, and
Lewis and Frank 2002). By contrast, Bellante and Link (1981) use answers
to questions like the condition and insurance of cars owned, the use of seat
belts, the extent of medical coverage, and smoking and drinking habits to
construct a measure of risk aversion. They find that, thus defined, risk-averse
people are more likely to be employed in the public sector than in the pri-
vate sector. Likewise, Roszkowski and Grable (2009) use data on clients of
financial planners who had completed a test of financial risk tolerance. They
find that public sector employees score significantly lower than private sector
employees, even after controlling for a rich set of observables. Similar results
are obtained by Hartog et al. (2002) for The Netherlands and by Guiso and
Paiella (2008) for Italy using large-scale survey data on people’s willingness
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to pay for a hypothetical lottery and for a hypothetical risky security, re-
spectively. Several recent papers in economics have added to this body of
evidence using the 2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel data,
which contains questions on people’s attitude towards risk-taking. Bonin
et al. (2007) show that working in the public sector implies a significantly
lower earnings risk than working in the private sector and that individuals
who are less risk tolerant more likely end up working in an occupation with
low earnings risk. Using the same data, Luechinger et al. (2007) and Pfeifer
(2008) directly estimate the effect of self-reported risk attitude on sector of
employment and report similar findings: people who are less willing to take
risk are more likely to be found in the public sector.
3 Data and empirical strategy
We use data from the TNO Work Situation Survey (TAS), a Dutch survey
developed by TNO (an independent research organization, partly funded by
the Dutch government) in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment. The survey was conducted in 2000 among about 8000
employees and self-employed persons in all sectors of the economy. The
response rate was 53%, resulting in 4334 respondents (see Smulders et al.
2001 and Bakhuys Roozenboom et al. 2007).3 The survey includes a rich set
of demographic variables and data on a wide range of work-related topics,
such as employment conditions, pay, hours worked, job and pay satisfaction,
attitude towards work, intention to leave, job security, health-related issues,
and workplace characteristics.
Our key variable of interest is the type of reward chosen by the respon-
dents for completing the survey (see Appendix A for the exact question and
possible answers).4 Respondents could choose between receiving a widely
redeemable gift certificate, receiving a national lottery ticket, or donating
the reward to a charity of their choice. All types of reward had the same
face value: 25 guilders (11.34 euro), about 15% of daily disposable household
3See for more information in English: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/
national/countries/netherlands2005_6_tas.htm
4The survey was repeated in 2002 and 2004. We do not use these data in our analysis
because in 2002 the data-collecting company did not report data on our key variable and in
2004 the reward for respondents was substantially lower and differed between completing
the internet questionnaire (10 euros) and the written questionnaire (7,50 euros).
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income in 2000.
Since respondents indicated their main economic sector in the survey, but
not whether their organization belongs to the public or private sector, we re-
coded the main economic sectors into public or private, using a data file we
obtained on request from Statistics Netherlands. The sectors thus included
in the public sector are education, hospitals, nursing homes, welfare work,
and central and local government. Four economic sectors contain a substan-
tial mix of private and public organizations; we omit these sectors from our
analyses.5 Furthermore, we confine ourselves to employees, leaving out the
self-employed, owners of firms, and (unpaid) family workers. We also restrict
the sample to respondents between 20 and 64 years of age, because there
are very few respondents under 20 years of age and 65 is the regular Dutch
retirement age. These selections leave us with a sample of 3126 respondents.
Our empirical strategy is to examine whether an otherwise comparable
respondent differs in his choice of reward depending on the sector of employ-
ment. If public sector workers are more altruistic and more risk averse at the
margin, we should find that public sector workers are more likely to donate
the reward to charity and less likely to choose the lottery ticket rather than to
opt for the gift certificate. Since our dependent variable has three potential
categorical outcomes (lottery ticket, charity, gift certificate) we analyze our
data using a multinomial logistic regression model. We take gift certificate
as our reference category, as this is the safe and selfish alternative.6
Obviously, the choice of the reward does not only depend on a respon-
dent’s risk preferences and pro-social attitude, but also on other characteris-
tics such as income. People with a low income may be more likely to choose
the gift certificate, as this could be exchanged for basic necessities such as
food or clothing. Therefore, we control for net monthly income in the re-
gression analyses, as well as for whether the respondent is the breadwinner
of his household. Since our categorical income measure is somewhat crude,
5These four sectors are: Other type of industry (which also comprises workers in shel-
tered employment), other type of transport and communication (which includes public
transport), other type of healthcare (among others general practitioners and midwifes)
and culture, sports, and recreation.
6We also ran binary logistic regression models (grouping charity and gift certificate as
the safe options; grouping gift certificate and lottery as the selfish options; taking only
the gift certificate as the selfish option, dropping the lottery ticket; and taking only the
gift certificate as the safe option, dropping the charity). All these models produced results
similar to the multinomial logistic regression model and are for brevity not reported.
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especially in the highest category, we also add managerial position to our
analysis. This is likely to pick up some additional income effects. Moreover,
we include the following demographic controls: Age, sex, region, education,
marital status, and the number of children living at the home.
An important issue is whether public and private sector employees had dif-
ferent attitudes before they sorted into their sector of employment or changed
their attitudes afterwards. To account for such tenure effects, we add em-
ployee’s tenure at the organization and interact it with the employee’s sector
of employment.7 Finally, we check whether feelings of underpayment affect
employee’s choice of reward using the question “Is your salary sufficient for
the work that you do?” and we also interact this variable with the employee’s
sector of employment.
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of our subsample. Some inter-
esting differences between public and private sector employees are visible.
First of all, private sector employees choose the lottery ticket (48%) more of-
ten than public sector employees (36%). Public sector employees on the other
hand choose to donate to charity (23%) somewhat more often than private
sector employees (21%). Further, there are substantial differences in socio-
demographic variables. Public sector workers are slightly older on average
than private sector employees, 44 versus 42 years old, and are far more often
female, 42% versus 18%. Public sector employees are (therefore) also less
likely to be the breadwinner in the household than private sector employees
(67% versus 79%). The majority of public sector employees completed higher
vocational education or university studies (66%), against only a minority of
private sector employees (36%). Nevertheless, the differences in income are
not that large. There is, however, a large difference in the answers to the
question “Is your salary sufficient for the work you do?”. Less than half of
public sector employees answers this question in the affirmative (44%), while
more than half of the private sector employees is satisfied with their salary
(58%). Finally, tenure among public sector employees in our sample is also
longer than that of private sector employees, 13.8 versus 11.8 years.
7Unfortunately, we lack data on respondent’s sectoral tenure.
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4 Results
Table 2 reports the results of our multinomial logistic regression analyses.8 In
model 1 we take up the public sector dummy as the sole explanatory variable.
Public sector employees are, as expected, significantly less likely than private
sector employees to choose the lottery ticket rather than the gift certificate.
However, in contrast to our expectations, public sector employees are also
less likely than private sector employees to opt for a donation to charity
rather than for the gift certificate. This effect, however, is not significant
and relatively small. Model 1 only explains little variation in the choice of
reward. Although it does fine in predicting the choice of the lottery ticket, it
performs extremely poor in predicting the choice of the charity. As we noticed
in the previous section, there are many more differences between public and
private sector employees than just sector of employment. Therefore, we add
several controls in model 2.
Remarkably, model 2 shows results quite close to model 1: Compared to
private sector employees, public sector employees are 0.74 times less likely
to choose the charity rather than the gift certificate. This time, the effect is
significant at the 5%-level. Public sector employees are also significantly less
likely to choose the lottery ticket over the gift certificate, as in the previous
model. Our estimation results imply that the odds for a public sector worker
of choosing the lottery ticket rather than the gift certificate are 0.68 times
the odds for a private sector worker.
The choice for the lottery ticket is significantly related to some of the
demographic variables. Women are less likely to choose the lottery ticket
over the gift certificate, as are employees with a higher level of education.
Couples with children living at home are more likely to choose the lottery
ticket than singles. However, the larger the number of children, the less likely
employees choose the lottery ticket. Finally, income and other variables af-
fecting people’s budget do not really matter.9 Income does, however, matter
for donating to charity. All budget-related variables show that as people’s
budget increases, the odds of choosing the charity over the gift certificate
8For ease of presentation, we treated managerial position, income, and education as
continuous variables in table 2. We also ran regressions using the ordinal categories of
these variables. This gave nearly the same results at the same significance levels.
9The results for the control variables are close to those of Hartog et al. (2002) and
Dohmen et al. (2009), except for the effect of education, which is positive in these earlier
studies.
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increase as well. A higher income or higher managerial position increases
the odds of choosing the charity over the gift certificate significantly, as does
not being the breadwinner. Furthermore, some of the demographic variables
also have an effect. Couples with children living at home are less likely to
choose the charity over the gift certificate than singles, although this effect is
only significant at the 10%-level. Older employees are more likely to choose
the charity over the gift certificate, as are employees with a higher level of
education.10 Lastly, note that the fit of model 2 is substantially better than
that of the previous model.11
Model 3 examines whether and if so how public sector workers’ risk and
pro-social attitudes develop during their career. As we discussed in the Intro-
duction, several earlier studies have found that altruistic motivations decline
with tenure among public sector employees (Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975,
and Cooman et al. 2009). We therefore add to model 2 employee’s tenure at
the organization as well as tenure interacted with the employee’s sector, and
similarly for tenure squared to allow for nonlinear effects.12 Tenure does not
affect the chances of taking the lottery ticket rather than the gift certificate
in either of the sectors. Figure 1a plots the point-estimates of the combined
public sector dummies against tenure. Clearly, public sector employees are
significantly more risk averse than private sector employees for almost all
levels of tenure and there is no clear pattern in this difference over people’s
tenure. However, we do find strong tenure differences for public sector em-
ployees in the odds of taking the charity rather than the gift certificate, while
there is no such tenure effect for private sector employees. Figure 1b, which
is again based on the estimation results of model 3, shows that at the start
of their careers, public sector employees are more likely to donate to charity
rather than take the gift certificate than their private sector counterparts,
although this is effect is not significant. After a few years, this (insignificant)
10Houston (2006) reports similar findings for these socio-demographic variables, except
for gender. He obtains a significant positive effect of being female on the odds of donating
to charity, whereas we find a negative, but not significant effect.
11We included ethnic minority, firm size, and age squared as additional contols in pre-
vious regressions. However, as those variables had no significant effect, we left them out
of our final regressions.
12We also ran regressions including interaction terms of age and public sector so as to rule
out that any possible tenure effects are actually driven by respondent’s age. The interaction
effect with age was never significant, nor did it change the effects and significance of tenure.
Obviously, since our data are cross-sectional, we can not completely rule out that tenure
effects are intertwined with cohort effects.
10
positive effect has disappeared and even reverses. Indeed, during the main
part of their careers, public sector employees are significantly less likely to
donate to charity than private sector employees.
One of the reasons for a negative effect of tenure on pro-social inclina-
tions of public sector employees might be that their tenure-wage profile is
flatter than that of private sector employees, which may give rise to grow-
ing feelings of underpayment. We control for these feelings of underpayment
using the variable “Is your salary sufficient for the work that you do?” and
its interaction with the public sector dummy. We are particularly interested
in whether public sector employees’ likelihood of donating to charity is more
strongly affected by feelings of underpayment than that of private sector
employees. This would support the idea that donations to charity and con-
tributions to society at the workplace are considered as substitutes by public
sector employees.
Model 4 shows no significant effect of feeling underpaid on the odds of
choosing the lottery ticket over the gift certificate. The other coefficients
explaining the choice of the lottery over the gift certificate are not much
affected. Figure 2a plots the point-estimates of the combined public sector
dummies for employees who think their salary is sufficient for the work they
do. During the main part of their career public sector employees are signif-
icantly less likely to choose the lottery ticket over the gift certificate than
private sector employees. This pattern is almost identical for employees who
do feel underpaid, as we can see in figure 2b.
We find striking effects of feelings of underpayment on the odds of choos-
ing the charity over the gift certificate. Employees who feel underpaid are
significantly less likely to donate to charity, and particularly so in the public
sector. The odds for a dissatisfied employee of donating his reward to charity
rather than taking the gift certificate are 0.68 and 0.41 times the odds for a
satisfied employee, in respectively the private and public sector.13 As is clear
from table 2, this difference between private and public sector workers is also
statistically significant. We thus find a clear indication that public sector
employees consider donations to charity as a substitute for their job-related
net contribution to society. Further, it can be seen from table 2 that among
the satisfied employees, public sector employees are significantly more likely
to donate than private sector employees at the start of their career. How-
13The odds for the public sector can easily be computed using the estimated coefficients
in table 2.
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ever, as before, within a few years this effect disappears, see figure 2c. Figure
2d plots the point estimates of the public sector dummy for dissatisfied em-
ployees. Clearly, among these employees, there is no significant difference
in pro-social inclinations between public and private sector employees at the
start of their career. As tenure increases, public sector employees become less
and less inclined to donate to charity. After about seven years, the difference
becomes statistically significant. Comparing figures 1b, 2c, and 2d, it follows
that controlling for feelings of underpayment hardly affect the tenure profile
in public sector employee’s inclination to donate to charity. Inspection of
the data shows that, somewhat surprisingly, there is no clear relationship
between feelings of underpayment and tenure. Hence, other factors seem to
play a role here, e.g. Blau (1960)’s disillusionment effect, which we discussed
in the Introduction.
5 Conclusion
Summarizing, we have found clear support for the hypothesis that public
sector employees are more risk averse than private sector employees. How-
ever, in contrast to our expectations, we have also found that public sector
employees are on average less inclined to make charitable contributions than
private sector employees. This effect is partly due to the fact that many
more people in the public sector feel underpaid. Moreover, we have found
that feelings of underpayment have much larger repercussions for the odds
of donating to charity in the public sector than in the private sector, sug-
gesting that public sector employees consider the contributions they make on
the job as a substitute for charitable donations. Our findings suggest that
many public sector employees feel that they already donate a lot to society
by exerting effort on the job for relatively little pay and, therefore, are less
willing to make any further contributions than their private sector counter-
parts. Lastly, we have found a clear effect of tenure on pro-social inclinations
in the public sector, which arises independently of feelings of dissatisfaction
about pay. As public sector employees’ tenure increases, they become less
and less inclined to make charitable contributions, while there is no tenure
effect for private sector employees. Such evolution of preferences for pub-
lic sector employees is well in line with studies by Blau (1960), Van Maanen
(1975), and De Cooman et al. (2009) documenting swift declines in altruistic
motivations with tenure among public sector employees.
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A Appendix
Final question of the survey:
Below you can indicate if you would like to receive a gift certificate or
a state lottery ticket (without jackpot). When you choose for one of these
options we need your name and address. You can also choose a charity, in
that case we donate f. 25,- (11,34 euro) for every completed questionnaire
to one of the organizations below. If you choose to donate to charity you do
not need to fill out a name and address.
1 Gift certificate (f 25,-) Name:
2 Lottery ticket Address :
Postal code and Place :
Charity:
3 Amnesty International 8 Wilhelmina Foundation
4 Unicef 9 Hart Foundation
5 Ronald McDonald House Charities 10 Animal protection
6 War Child 11 Greenpeace
7 Carnation Foundation
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs
Public 
Sector
Private 
Sector Total
Reward: 3126
Gift certificate 41.0% 31.3% 34.3%
Lottery ticket 35.7% 48.1% 44.2%
Charity 23.3% 20.7% 21.5%
Sex: Male (%) 3122 57.6% 82.4% 74.8%
Age:
Mean (years) 3126 44.2 41.9 42.6
Standard Deviation (8.8) (9.3) (9.2)
Education: 3058
No education attended/finished 0.2% 0.6% 0.5%
Primary school 0.7% 2.8% 2.2%
Lower secondary school 6.2% 21.4% 16.6%
Intermediate secondary school or intermediate 
vocational training 26.9% 39.6% 35.6%
Higher secondary school or higher vocational 
training 50.7% 28.2% 35.2%
(Post-) University 15.2% 7.5% 9.9%
Net monthly income: 2997
Less than fl. 500,- 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
fl.  500,- until fl. 1000,- 1.9% 1.5% 1.6%
fl. 1000,- until fl. 1500,- 3.8% 3.0% 3.3%
fl. 1500,- until fl. 2000,- 7.4% 4.4% 5.4%
fl. 2000,- until fl. 2500,- 11.8% 9.9% 10.5%
fl. 2500,- until fl. 3000,- 14.3% 19.3% 17.7%
fl. 3000,- until fl. 3500,- 16.6% 18.4% 17.8%
fl. 3500,- until fl. 4000,- 13.6% 15.0% 14.5%
fl. 4000,- until fl. 5000,- 19.7% 15.7% 17.0%
fl. 5000,- until fl. 6000,- 5.6% 6.2% 6.0%
fl. 6000,- or more 4.7% 5.9% 5.5%
Breadwinner: Yes (%) 3105 67% 79% 76%
Marital Status: 3125
Married/cohabitating without children living at 
home 25.9% 25.0% 25.3%
Married/cohabitating with children living at home 53.5% 59.9% 58.0%
Single parent 6.0% 2.2% 3.4%
Single 14.6% 12.8% 13.4%
Number of children living at home
Mean 3125 1.2 1.2 1.2
Standard Deviation 1.2 1.1 1.2
(Continued on the next page)  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (continued)
Variable Obs
Public 
Sector
Private 
Sector Total
Managerial position/employer?: 3113
No 69.8% 62.1% 64.5%
1-4 employees 10.3% 16.7% 14.7%
5-9 employees 5.5% 9.3% 8.2%
10-19 employees 6.2% 5.4% 5.7%
20-49 employees 4.8% 4.0% 4.2%
50 employees 3.4% 2.5% 2.8%
Province: 3126
Groningen 5.0% 3.1% 3.7%
Friesland 4.1% 4.3% 4.3%
Drenthe 4.5% 4.2% 4.3%
Overijssel 6.9% 7.4% 7.3%
Gelderland 12.5% 12.4% 12.4%
Utrecht 3.0% 3.9% 3.6%
Noord Holland 15.2% 16.8% 16.3%
Zuid Holland 23.6% 23.4% 23.4%
Zeeland 3.1% 2.4% 2.6%
Noord Brabant 12.3% 13.3% 13.0%
Limburg 7.8% 7.2% 7.4%
Flevoland 2.0% 1.6% 1.7%
Tenure:
Mean (years) 3098 13.8 11.8 12.4
Standard Deviation (10.1) (10.3) (10.3)
Salary sufficient for the work you do? : Yes (%) 2887 44.5% 58.3% 53.9%
Total number of observations 966 2160 3126
Note : Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the unweighted subsample used in our regression analysis. 
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Figure 1a: Point Estimate Public Sector for Lottery Ticket 
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
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Figure 1b: Point Estimate Public Sector for Charity 
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
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Figure 2a: Point Estimate Public Sector for Lottery Ticket (vs 
Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
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Figure 2b: Point Estimate Public Sector for Lottery Ticket (vs 
Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
Employees dissatisfied salary/work
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Figure 2c: Point Estimate Public Sector for Charity
 (vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
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Figure 2d: Point Estimate Public Sector for Charity 
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
Employees dissatisfied salary/work
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